[COPY] From Savannah to Glory

Eighth Air Force in World War II

From Savannah to Glory – VIII Bomber Command

By the end of World War II in Europe, the United States Eighth Air Force was the most famous unit in the United States Army Air Forces and, until the massive B-29 raids against Japan in the spring of 1945, the most powerful. After more than two years of aerial bombardment of targets in Germany and Occupied Europe, the Eighth had come to symbolize heavy bombing.  But while the Eighth is known as THE heavy bombardment outfit, it didn’t start out that way. When it was first established on January 2, 1942, the unit that became famous as the Eighth Air Force was actually designated as Fifth Air Force. However, this designation had already been reserved for a numbered air force in the Far East, so it was changed to the Eighth. Nor was the Eighth conceived as an aerial bombardment command – its original mission was tactical in nature. The Eighth came into existence to serve as an air element to support GYMNAST, the planned invasion of Northwest Africa, which was scheduled to take place later in the year.

On January 28, 1942, Eighth Air Force Headquarters activated at Savannah Army Airfield, Georgia under the command of Colonel Asa N. Duncan. The new command drew heavily on Southerners for staffing, civilians who were brought into the Army with direct commissions often without formal military training. To provide military order, a number of Regular Army NCOs were commissioned. Over the next few weeks, the Eighth underwent several changes. GYNMAST was canceled due to the emergency situation in the Pacific, eliminating the need for the new unit as it had originally been conceived and leaving the Eighth without a mission. One of the Army plans called for the establishment of an Army Air Force in Great Britain. On March 31 Major General Carl Spaatz, commander of the Army Air Force Combat Command, proposed that the task-less Eighth Air Force be made available for duty in England. Spaatz also decided that it would be under his direct command. General Ira Eaker was already in England with an Army Air Forces advance party, and Spaatz decided that it would pave the way for his new command.

The emphasis of the Army Air Force in Great Britain would be on long-range strategic bombing as the Allies prepared for a cross-channel invasion. Previously, Colonel Duncan had requested the assignment of three heavy bomber groups, two groups of medium bombers and three fighter groups. The reorganization increased the planned size of the Eighth to twenty-three heavy, three medium and five light bomber groups, along with four groups of dive bombers and thirteen pursuit groups. Two troop carrier groups would also be added. The dive bomber groups would never materialize. In April Duncan, now a Brigadier General, was made subordinate to Spaatz and the headquarters was split into two echelons. Administrative functions remained in Savannah while operations moved to Bolling Field on the outskirts of Washington where General Spaatz had his headquarters. Spaatz took formal command on May 5 and preparations began to move the Eighth to England.

Shortly after Spaatz assumed command, an advance echelon moved to England; there they joined Eaker’s organization which had been designated as Army Air Forces British Isles. Other Eighth officers followed over the next few weeks. In mid-April, Eaker took over a girls school at High Wycombe for the new headquarters. Eaker’s role was to prepare the way for the arrival of Spaatz and the Eighth Air Force staff; in the interim his organization was redesignated as Detachment Headquarters, Eighth Air Force. Eaker’s staff worked diligently to develop a plan of action for the employment of the Eighth Air Force combat units when they arrived in England, with particular emphasis on bombardment. He borrowed heavily on the experiences of the British and closely followed the lines of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command which was headquartered nearby at High Wycombe. On May 18, Eaker notified Spaatz that the bomber headquarters should be ready to control and supervise bombardment operations by early June. Once Spaatz arrived in England, Eaker would become commander of VIII Bomber Command. Brigadier General Frank O’D Hunter would command VIII Fighter Command.

In June the combat units began moving to England, though the initial departures were delayed by the Battle of Midway as the 97^th Bombardment and 82^nd Fighter Groups went to the west coast. One fighter group left its P-39s behind and moved to England by ship, then equipped with Supermarine Spitfires, as did other groups that followed. For several months, the only American-built fighters in Europe would be P-38s. When the Battle of Midway ended, the 97^th Bomb Group was released for European duty. The first B-17s arrived in England on July 1.

Ironically, the first Eighth Air Force unit to fly a combat mission wasn’t a B-17 outfit, nor had it been intended as a bombardment group. In May 1942 the 15^th Bombardment Squadron deployed to England as an independent squadron to serve as a night-fighter outfit using Douglas A-20 Bostons. When they got there the squadron crews learned that the British weren’t using their Bostons in that role, so they began training for light attack missions with RAF 226 Squadron, which flew the export version of the highly maneuverable Douglas bomber, the DB-7. By the end of June, a number of crews were considered combat-ready, and Spaatz decided to put them into action at the first opportunity. The first mission was set for the American holiday of the Fourth of July – six US Army crews were assigned to fly six RAF Bostons on a low-level 12-airplane mission with six RAF crews against German airfields in Holland. Although the mission was a propaganda coup, the results were less than spectacular. Four crews failed to find the targets, two airplanes were shot down and a third was badly damaged. One RAF Boston was also lost. One American pilot, Captain Charles C. Kegelman, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for attacking a German flak tower with only one operating engine. The 15^th Bomb Squadron soon received its own Bostons and was the only Eighth Air Force bomber unit flying combat for several weeks. The 15^th would transfer to North Africa later in the year.

After weather forced the cancellation of a mission on August 10, the 97^th Bomb Group finally flew its first mission on August 17, 1942. A “small” force of eighteen B-17s (at the time, heavy bomber missions in the Pacific rarely consisted of more than a dozen airplanes) flew Eighth Air Force Mission Number 1. Twelve B-17s attacked a railroad marshalling yard at Rouen, France while the other six made a diversionary sweep along the French coast. General Spaatz came to watch the bombers take off, while General Eaker accompanied the mission flying as a passenger in Yankee Doodle Dandy, the lead airplane. Escorted by RAF Spitfires, the B-17s set out across the English Channel under generally clear skies. All twelve airplanes bombed the target, with about half of the bombs falling in the general vicinity of the target. One of the aiming points was hit while the second was missed by about half a mile. But considering that the marshalling yards made a relatively large target, even the bombs that missed could possibly do some damage. Spaatz wired Washington that the bombing “far exceeded” any previous bombing by British or German planes in terms of accuracy. He claimed that the results of the mission “justified” American faith in “daylight precision bombing” and optimistically asserted that it proved that the B-17s could “get through.” Only three German fighters had actually attacked the formation; several others observed from afar.  Damage from antiaircraft fire was slight.

The first fighter attacks came on August 21 when a foul-up in communications led to the formation arriving over the coast of Holland without a fighter escort. Even though a recall message was sent out, German fighters came in for a lackluster attack. Surprisingly, in spite of attacks by more than forty Luftwaffe fighters, only one B-17 suffered serious damage and the loss of the co-pilot, 2^nd Lieutenant Donald Walter, who died of wounds to become the Eighth’s first heavy bomber combat casualty. The gunners in the formation claimed to have shot down scores of German fighters, although the final number was determined to have been two shot down, five probables and six damaged. Exaggeration of claims for enemy fighters continued among the B-17 groups.

The 97^th Bombardment Group was alone in the daylight heavy bomber role until September 5, when the formation of thirty-seven B-17s included twelve from the newly arrived 301^st BG for Mission Nine. Another group, the 92^nd, made its first contribution to the bombing campaign the following day, when fourteen group airplanes joined twenty-seven from the 97^th on a mission to Meaulte. Thirteen 301^st Flying Fortresses attacked the airfield at St. Omer while a dozen 15^th Bomb Squadron Bostons attacked Abbeville. Two B-17s were shot down, the first Eighth Air Force heavy bombers lost in combat. On October 2 thirty-seven B-17s went back to Meaulte, this time encountering large numbers of German fighters, although none of the heavy bombers failed to make it home. So many fighters were reported to have been shot down that the gunners had to be interrogated twice. The final results were listed as four destroyed, five probables and one damaged. The attacks on the formation came in spite of more than 400 escorting Allied fighters.

On October 9 the Eighth Air Force flew its first truly large-scale mission, and the most important mission of 1942. The mission against Lille consisted of 108 heavy bombers, including two dozen Consolidated B-24 Liberators from the 93^rd Bombardment Group on their inaugural mission. The B-17-equipped 306^th Bombardment Group was also on its first mission. German opposition was fierce, the first real effort against the bombers, as the Luftwaffe ignored the British and American fighters and went straight for the bombers. Three B-17s and one B-24 failed to return; four B-17s suffered heavy damage while another 32 B-17s and ten B-24s received slight damage from fighter attacks.

Initial claims by the gunners were 56 destroyed, 26 probables and 20 damaged, an impossible score since it would have accounted for 15% of the estimated Luftwaffe fighter strength in Western Europe. This number was subject to constant revision over the next several months and finally went into the books as 21 destroyed, 21 probables and fifteen damaged. These numbers were still too high since British intelligence believed that no more than sixty German fighters could have possibly intercepted the formation. There was little doubt that the youthful B-17 gunners were exaggerating their claims, as postwar analysis of German records would prove. The B-24 gunners put in more modest claims of six destroyed, five probables and four damaged; every Liberator in the formation had been attacked repeatedly and all had suffered damage.

In October, Eighth Air Force lost much of its strength to the Mediterranean, including two B-17 groups and nearly all of its fighters as well as the two troop carrier groups. In addition, three squadrons of B-24s from the 93^rd also went to Africa for a period of temporary duty, first with Twelfth, then with Ninth Air Force. Two new groups of B-17s and one of B-24s soon became operational. The 329^th Bomb Squadron from the 93^rd BG remained in England to experiment with electronically guided bad weather harassment missions that the crews referred to as “moling.” Ironically, the first mission into German airspace was cancelled when the crews broke out of the clouds into clear weather over the Ruhr! That American heavy bombers had been over Germany was kept secret.

During the fall and winter of 1942, the main effort of the Eighth was aimed at the German submarine pens located in France and the Occupied countries. On January 27, 1943, the first large-scale mission into Germany saw a mixed force of 91 heavy bombers, including a small formation of B-24s, go against Wilhelmshaven. The mission met with limited success due to clouds over the target, but the clouds also kept fighter opposition low. Two B-24s from the 44^th Bomb Group and one B-17 were lost to fighters, but the bomber gunners claimed 22 enemy aircraft (actual German losses were seven.)

Although Eighth Air Force included a fighter command, operations in North Africa severely depleted US fighter strength in England. For several weeks, the only American fighters still in England were P-38s that were being held in reserve to reinforce North Africa. In January 1943 the 56^th Fighter Group arrived in England and soon began flying combat with Republic P-47 Thunderbolts. Bomber losses had so far been low, leading the Eighth Air Force leadership to conclude that the heavy firepower on the bombers was sufficient to defend against fighter attack. When General Henry H. Arnold ordered the transfer of the 78^th Fighter Group’s P-38s to North Africa, the group was left without airplanes. Both the 78^th and the 4^th Fighter Group, the famous “Eagle Squadron” of former RAF pilots, began transitioning into P-47s, but it would be well into spring before VIII Fighter Command would become active in the air war in Europe.

While the 93^rd Bomb Group was in Africa, the newly arrived 44^th Bomb Group was left to go it alone as the only Liberator outfit with Eighth – except for the 329^th Bomb Squadron – for several months. When it began combat operations, the 44^th was subjected to a number of unfortunate accidents and incidents that soon gained the group a reputation as a “hard luck” outfit. Their first loss came on December 6 when the six airplanes of the 68^th Bomb Squadron failed to receive a recall message and went on to their target at Abbeville alone. An attack by some thirty German fighters resulted in damage to all six Liberators and the loss of one. A mission to St. Nazaire met with disaster on January 3^rd when the B-17s leading the mission got lost and the formation ended up out over the Irish Sea. The Liberators were carrying reduced fuel loads for what would have been a short mission, and the navigational error left the B-24s without enough fuel to make it home. Several had to crash-land in English pastures. The incident led to the replacement of the group commander by Col. Leon Johnson, but things were no better under him as losses continued, some to enemy action and others to accident. The losses led some people to begin complaining that the B-24 was an inferior airplane to the B-17, asserting that perhaps they should be withdrawn from the theater.

By mid-March the 93^rd had returned from Africa and on the 18^th the two Liberator groups flew their first mission together. Because of their faster speed, the B-24s maintained their own formation within the larger bomber stream. With only two groups of Liberators, while more and more B-17 groups were arriving in England every month, General Eaker began using B-24s for tasks other than daylight bombing. Both groups were under-strength and at one point the 44^th had more airplanes than crews. In late April Eaker selected the 93^rd to train for night bombing, using the technology the 329^th Bomb Group was experienced with. The night-bombing experiment of the 93^rd was short-lived. Within a couple of weeks, both the 93^rd and 44^th were pulled off of combat operations altogether and began flying low-level training missions over the English countryside in preparation for a classified mission. The 389^th Bomb Group joined them when it arrived in England, and all three groups set out for North Africa for a stint of temporary duty with Ninth Air Force, which had two B-24 groups. While operating from Libya, the three groups took part in operations in support of the invasion of Sicily, the first mission against Rome and the granddaddy of them all, the daring low-level mission against the oil fields at Ploesti, Romania.

In May 1943, just as the VIII Bomber Command Liberators were taken off combat operations, the medium bombers of the 322^nd Bombardment Group made their combat debut – with disastrous results. The 322^nd was equipped with the twin-engine Martin B-26 Marauder, which had a bad reputation in the US, although the single group that operated them in the Pacific had achieved limited success. On May 14 the 322^nd launched its first mission, a low-level raid against a power plant at Ijmuiden on the Dutch coast. The mission was unsuccessful – in spite of the low-level attack, which should have resulted in accurate bombing, not a single bomb hit the target. Several airplanes were hit by flak and one crew was forced to bailout near their home base. Since the target was undamaged, a second mission was scheduled for May 17. Half of the force of eleven B-26s was to hit the power plant again, while the other half was to attack another generating plant at Haarlem. Disaster was the order of the day – only one airplane returned from the raid, and its pilot had aborted before reaching Holland. The attacking formation got lost and blundered into the most heavily defended airspace in Holland. Several airplanes were shot down and two were lost in a mid-air collision. Every airplane was lost, along with 62 airmen, of which twenty became POWs. As a consequence of the losses, the B-26s were taken off combat operations while new tactics were worked out. Under the new tactics, the medium bombers were restricted to attacks at medium altitudes from 12-15,000 feet and were always escorted, usually by RAF Spitfires. General Eaker had hoped that the B-26s could serve as a diversion to draw German fighters away from B-17 formations, but the concept was never fulfilled. The medium bombers would leave Eighth and transfer to Ninth Air Force for tactical operations when it arrived in England in the fall of 1943.

The summer and fall of 1943 is the period that has been called “The Fall of Fortresses.” With the Liberators off in Africa, the B-17s were left alone in the skies over Germany and Western Europe. As heavy bomber strength increased, VIII Bomber Command began sending its B-17s deeper and deeper on penetration raids into Germany proper. With the longer missions came increased exposure to German fighters and antiaircraft fire, and aircraft losses mounted. The April 17 mission to Bremen was a portend of things to come – out of 115 B-17s from the 1^st Bombardment Wing, sixteen bombers were shot down and forty-six others damaged. It would get worse, much worse.

In May, Army Air Forces leaders in Europe realized that German fighters were the primary obstacle to the deep penetration missions into Germany. During the early bombing campaign, the Luftwaffe had held its fighters back, leading some air officers to underestimate the true strength of the German fighter force. As Allied bombers began appearing over Germany in daylight in greater numbers, Luftwaffe fighter strength began increasing until it had almost doubled by mid-1943. As losses mounted, the AAF leadership recognized the need for long-range escort fighters. At the time, the only fighter with true long-range capabilities was the P-38, and all of those in England had been sent to Africa and the Mediterranean. They were replaced by P-47s equipped with external fuel tanks, but even with the tanks the Thunderbolts were only able to provide escort for 175 miles into enemy airspace. While the Lockheed P-38s had the range to go deep into Germany, there were none in England until late summer. When they did arrive, the twin-engine fighters were plagued with problems that limited their effectiveness.

While the B-24s in Africa, the B-17s were alone over Germany. The B-17 crews didn’t know where the Liberators had gone, and rumors started that they had been withdrawn from combat. After a two-week rest in early August, they were sent out on the most ambitious mission yet – an attack on the Messerschmitt plants at Regensburg, Germany and Wiener-Neustadt, Austria. The original plan called for the B-17s to fly from England, then go on to Africa, but since there weren’t enough Flying Fortresses equipped with long-range fuel tanks, a new plan was developed. The three Eighth Air Force B-24 groups were still in Africa, recuperating from the effects of the maximum effort low-level attack on the Ploesti oilfields that had taken place on August 1. They were to join the two Ninth Air Force Liberator groups in an attack on Wiener-Neustadt while the B-17s struck Regensburg in a two-pronged attack that would split the German fighter defenses. The date of the attack was set for August 7, but bad weather over Europe kept the B-17s from making the trip. The Liberators went against Wiener-Neustadt on the thirteenth without the benefit of the B-17s for a diversion.

Finally, on August 17, seven B-17 groups from the 4^th Bombardment Wing took off from England on the first “shuttle bombing” mission; after striking Regensberg, they would continue on to North Africa to spend the night, then come back to England on another mission. The 1^st Bombardment Wing’s B-17s would attack the ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt. But the 1^st Wing was delayed for several hours due to bad weather, then the P-47s that were supposed to escort the trailing sections of the Regensburg force failed to make the rendezvous, leaving the rearmost B-17s unescorted. When the escorts reached their fuel limit and had to turn back, the Luftwaffe came in for the kill and B-17s began falling out of the sky. The Fortresses were under constant attack for an hour and a half, during which seventeen B-17s were shot down and scores damaged. By the time the B-17s reached Africa, twenty-four B-17s were MIA, including several that had to ditch in the Mediterranean. The Schweinfurt force also met with vicious attacks and suffered even heavier losses. They fell under attack as soon as they came over land at Antwerp. No less than 36 Boeings were shot down. All told, 60 Flying Fortresses were lost on August 17, and the heavy losses were not going to stop.

By early September the Eighth’s three B-24 groups were back in England. A new group also arrived, bringing B-24 strength to four groups while B-17 strength had increased to 16 ½ combat groups. On the sixth Eighth mounted its first large-scale raid since the disastrous Regensburg-Schweinfurt mission as 407 heavy bombers were sent out. The B-24s flew a diversionary mission near the North Sea while the B-17s went to Stuttgart. Contrary to the experience of other missions, the heavy bombers did not encounter a single enemy aircraft!

September also saw the inauguration of a new method of bombing that would allow missions on cloudy days. For several months Eighth Air Force had experimented with various methods of “blind bombing,” at first using the British “Gee” navigational system. In early 1943 the Eighth Air Force began experimenting with H2S, a British-developed method using radar for terrain mapping that allowed the operators to identify targets by the terrestrial features. The 482^nd Bombardment Group was chosen to become a “pathfinder” group with airplanes equipped with radar-bombing equipment, an American-built version of the British system that was designated as H2X. On September 27 pathfinder B-17s led a force of 305 Flying Fortresses against Emden while the as yet non-radar B-24s went to Brussels on a diversion. Only one combat wing managed to bomb on the pathfinder’s marker, but the mission broke new ground. Other missions introduced the use of “Chaff,” small strips of aluminum foil, to interfere with the German radar, and electronics counter-measures equipment known as CARPET.

October 14 would come to be known as “Black Thursday” when a large force of B-17s ran into intense enemy opposition on a second mission against Schweinfurt. Weather conditions over England were abominable, but the B-17s were able to assemble with the use of their newly installed navigational equipment. The B-24s found it almost impossible to assemble, and only 29 Liberators were able to form into a group, a number too small to go to such a heavily defended target. The B-24 commander, Col. Leland Fiegel of the 93^rd, led the Liberators on a diversion instead of going to Schweinfurt as originally planned. The B-17s caught hell. As soon as the escorts turned back, wave after wave of German fighters began striking with a fury. Some twin-engine fighters were firing rockets, while the Me-109s and FW-190s came in to close range with their guns. Losses among the B-17s were even greater than on the previous Schweinfurt mission. No less than 60 B-17s were lost, along with their crews, while seventeen others were put out of action by major damage. One hundred and twenty-one B-17s suffered slight to major damage.

The second Schweinfurt mission clearly demonstrated that the Allies had yet to gain air superiority over Europe, and that a continuation of unescorted missions deep into Germany would prove extremely costly in both men and equipment. The only answer was to increase the range of the fighters. With two 75-gallon wing tanks, the few P-38s in the theater could operate up to 520 miles into enemy territory – their range would be increased to 585 miles with larger tanks – but the P-47s were limited to a maximum of 370 miles and it wasn’t until December that there were enough P-38s available to be effective. The first P-51Bs did not become operational until December and it would not be until March 1944 that the Mustangs had the range to go with the bombers all the way to their targets. Consequently, the Eighth Air Force made no more raids into Germany in clear weather for the remainder of 1943.

The final months of 1943 brought about some major changes within the US Army Air Forces assigned to the ETO. With there no longer a need for Ninth Air Force in North Africa, its headquarters transferred to England to form a tactical air force for support of the cross-channel invasion. Its two heavy bomber groups joined with three from the Twelfth Air Force to serve as the nucleus for a second force of heavy bombers that would strike at targets in Germany from the south. The new unit was organized as Fifteenth Air Force, with Lt. General James H. Doolittle in command. Doolittle’s former unit, Twelfth Air Force, would become a tactical air force assigned to direct air support of ground forces in the Mediterranean. Several heavy bomber groups, mostly B-24 groups, that had been consigned to Eighth Air Force were diverted to the new Fifteenth Air Force. A new command organization was planned to command and control strategic bombing activities in Europe. Eighth Air Force headquarters moved up to become the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe with General Carl Spaatz in command. The former VIII Bomber Command was elevated to air force level and became Eighth Air Force.

The reorganization also led to the transfer of Jimmy Doolittle to England, a purely political move. Some high-ranking British officers had taken a liking to the flamboyant Doolittle when they worked with him in North Africa and asked Spaatz to bring him up, which he did over Eaker’s objection. Doolittle was given command of the new Eighth Air Force while Ira Eaker was moved to Italy to take command of a new organization that had been created there as the command organization for American air units in the Mediterranean. The switch caused a rift between Eaker and Doolittle that was never mended. Doolittle took his new command on January 6, 1944, the same day the new USSAFE activated.

At the end of the year the Eighth Air Force heavy bomber force stood at 25 ¾ groups, reflecting the assignment of several new B-24 groups. A handful of B-17 groups were still in training in the US, but most of the new groups were equipping with the more capable Liberator. General George Kenney, MacArthur’s air boss, replaced all of the B-17s in the Pacific with B-24s. Eighth Air Force would remain a predominantly B-17 outfit due to the groups that were already in theater, but Fifteenth would be dominated by B-24s. For reasons that have never been fully explained, Doolittle preferred the B-17 and attempted to replace the Liberators in his command, but the cessation of B-17 production and the end of the war in Europe prevented a complete conversion.

With the return of the high Allied command to England, the focus was on the planned cross-channel invasion of France that was scheduled to take place in the late spring of 1944. The goal of Spaatz’ new command was to obtain complete air superiority over France. Missions in the latter weeks of 1943 and January and early February 1944 were aimed primarily at naval and shipbuilding facilities on the North Sea, usually using the new Pathfinders to mark the targets, but planning for the invasion led to attacks on the German aircraft industry. In November plans were laid for an all-out bomber offensive against the factories where the German fighters were made, but it wasn’t until February 19 that the European weather cleared enough to allow the offensive to commence.

The mission of February 20 was the largest of the war to date, with more than 1,000 B-17s and B-24s dispatched, along with seventeen fighter groups for escort duty. The escorts included two groups of Ninth Air Force P-51s, but the majority of the fighters were P-47s and two groups of P-38s that could go all the way to the target. Only 21 heavy bombers were lost out of the thousand-plane force. Only a month before no less than 60 bombers had been reported as MIA on a single mission, nearly all B-17s, of which 34 were out of a 174-plane force that went to Oscherlaben. The last week of February came to be known as Big Week, as Eighth and Fifteenth Air Force bombers attacked targets all over Germany. Over the six-day period, 137 Eighth Air Force heavy bombers were lost, along with 89 from Fifteenth. The daylight offensive was coordinated with British Royal Air Force night raids against the same targets.

In the spring of 1944, the USSAFE turned its attention to the Axis oil industry, both petroleum and synthetic, and transportation. The goal of both campaigns was to reduce the effectiveness of the German army and air forces by depriving them of the petroleum products necessary to operate their mechanized equipment and to reinforce their troops in Western Europe when the invasion began. Oil refineries and railroad marshalling yards were the primary targets. Other missions were flown against the new V-weapon sites from which the missiles were being launched against England. As the date for the invasion drew near, Eighth’s heavy bombers joined Ninth Air Force medium and light bombers in attacks on targets along the French coast.

Eighth Air Force’s original purpose was to prepare the way for Allied ground forces invasion of Western Europe through a strategic air campaign against German industry. Once the troops were ashore, the Eighth no longer had a mission, but with such a huge aerial armada available, one had to be found for it. The new mission was oriented toward providing tactical support for the troops on the ground while simultaneously maintaining pressure on the German homeland with daily air attacks on the industrial centers and rear area depots and transportation arteries. The campaign against German oil production continued, particularly in the Fifteenth Air Force area of operations in which the Ploesti oil refineries lay.

Even though Allied troops were ashore in France, Eighth Air Force bomber crews and fighter pilots continued to take heavy casualties. As the German fighter strength decreased, their antiaircraft defenses became even more deadly. In July alone the Eighth lost 324 heavy bombers; August was right behind as 318 B-17s and B-24s were reported MIA. Losses among Fifteenth Air Force crews were proportionally even higher, and would rise even as Eighth Air Force losses declined due to the most heavily defended targets in Germany and Austria lying within its area of operations.

Several changes took place within the Eighth Air Force in the summer of 1944. Due to their longer experience with B-17s, the leadership of the Eighth Air Force preferred the Flying Fortress over the Liberator and five bomber groups of the Third Air Division converted to the older type of bomber. During the late summer of 1944 hundreds of Eighth Air Force Liberators were temporarily assigned to transport duties, moving cargo and gasoline from England to forward airfields that had recently been captured. One of the most hazardous Eighth Air Force missions of the war was the airdrops of cargo from B-24s to the American, British and Polish paratroopers who jumped into Holland.

With the Allied victory in the Battle of the Bulge, it was obvious that Germany was breathing its last gasp as the Russians moved into Germany from the East and the Americans and British from the west. But there were still casualties, particularly after the Luftwaffe introduced their new high-performance jet fighters into the war. And flak remained deadly. By April the war was clearly won, and plans were made for Eighth to transfer to the Pacific and equip with B-29s. Eighth Air Force headquarters did, in fact, transfer to Okinawa but the war in the Pacific came to an end before any combat units became operational.

During two years and ten months of combat operations, Eighth Air Force achieved several distinctions: It was in combat the longest of any US Army unit in the European theater. The Eighth also sustained the heaviest losses of any United States military organization – including the entire United States Marine Corps. Eighth Air Force casualties were more than 47,000 men, of which 26,000 were KIA and some 4,000 heavy bombers were reported MIA.